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EthiopiaThis study examines the effect of smallholder farmers’ access to a formal climate risk transfer mechanism
on their risk preferences. Survey and experimental data were collected from smallholder farmers that
have access to weather index-based crop insurance (WICI) in Ethiopia. We use an endogenous switching
probit (ESP) model to address self-selection and simultaneity biases. Results from the ESP model show
that farmers who purchased WICI are less likely to be risk-averse compared with the counterfactual sce-
nario of being non-purchaser farmers. Similarly, non-purchasers would have attained a significant reduc-
tion in their risk-aversion if they had taken up the insurance product. We also find that WICI has a
positive and statistically significant effect on farmers’ real-life risk-taking behavior as exemplified by
mineral fertilizer use. The implication of our findings is that formal climate risk transfer mechanisms
can positively influence rural household farm investment decisions, by reducing individual risk-
aversion. Therefore, they can possibly contribute to poverty alleviation and economic development
within agrarian economies that are exposed to recurrent and severe climate shocks.
 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Agricultural households in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are facing
more frequent and severe climate risks than ever before (Masih,
Maskey, & Trambauer, 2014; Shiferaw et al., 2014). The absence
or inaccessibility of formal credit and insurance markets limits
the ability of agricultural households to withstand the effects of cli-
mate shocks (Karlan, Osei, Osei-akoto, & Udry, 2014), and has been
a key determinant of longer-term poverty dynamics (Chantarat,
Barrett, Mude, & Turvey, 2007; Barnett, Barrett, & Skees, 2008).
In the presence of uninsured weather shocks, any reduction in
farming households’ agricultural production can have detrimental
impacts on food and income available for consumption (Hertel &
Rosch, 2010). Hence, most households respond by altering their
economic behavior and decisions, which have repercussions on
their production. In this respect, it is generally assumed thatfarmers in developing countries are risk-averse as an ex-ante
response to minimize the climate shock-induced income variabil-
ity that they frequently experience. Accordingly, the households
will ‘‘self-insure” by engaging in low-risk low-return agricultural
activities (Rosenzweig & Binswanger, 1993) which in the short-
run may seem sub-optimal. However, in the long-term, risk aver-
sion ultimately traps agricultural households in persistent poverty
(Carter & Barrett, 2006; Yesuf & Bluffstone, 2009; Dercon &
Christiaensen, 2011).
Risk-aversion is a significant determinant of households’ deci-
sions that lead to: low investments in higher-income farm enter-
prise combinations (Nyikal & Kosura, 2005), assigning a lower
value to education attainment (Brown, Fang, & Gomes, 2012),
and low adoption of agricultural technologies (Liu, 2013; Ward &
Singh, 2015; Brick & Visser, 2015; Holden & Quiggin, 2017). At
the aggregate level, households’ low investments in physical and
human capital may further aggravate the productivity lag and
income inequality in rural areas of SSA (Odusola et al., 2017),
where high inequality has constrained poverty reduction efforts
(Fosu, 2015). Hence, risk-aversion is linked to development pro-
spects of a country by influencing households’ production,
2 K.K. Haile et al. /World Development 130 (2020) 104930consumption, and labor supply decisions which in turn determine
the accumulation of human, physical, and financial capital.
In light of this, there has been a growing interest in developing
weather index-based crop insurance (WICI) schemes that provide a
transparent risk transferring mechanism for smallholder farmers
to help them better manage climate risks and exhibit risk-taking
behavior in their agricultural practices (Barnett et al., 2008). Few
studies analyze the impact of WICI on households’ decision to
invest in high-risk high-return activities (Hill & Viceisza, 2012;
Mobarak & Rosenzweig, 2012; Karlan et al., 2014). These studies
examine how improving access to formal insurance markets affects
farmers’ willingness to take risky investment decisions using field
experiments in developing countries. However, such an approach
simultaneously captures risk preferences, beliefs about the back-
ground risk (i.e. uninsurable idiosyncratic risks associated with
the investment), and opportunities to engage in a given behavior
(e.g. available investment options) (Schildberg-hörisch, 2018). Fur-
thermore, these studies implicitly take risk preferences as stable
over time and exogenous in the WICI impact pathways. Hence,
the fixity of farmers’ risk preferences is assumed rather than mea-
sured an approach akin to the canonical economic model of
decision-making. Although standard economic models assume
exogenous and stable preferences (Friedman, 1962; Stigler &
Becker, 1977) overlooking the fundamental endogeneity of prefer-
ences would limit the insights that could be gained from examin-
ing household decision-making (Becker & Mulligan, 1997;
Krackhardt, 1998; Netzer, 2009). ‘‘If preferences are affected by
the policies or institutional arrangements we study, we can neither
accurately predict nor coherently evaluate the likely consequences
of new policies or institutions without taking account of preference
endogeneity” (Bowles, 1998). Therefore, ignoring the endogeneity
of risk preferences restricts an empirical inquiry into a plausible
mechanism through which risk management policy or program
interventions may influence households’ economic decisions and
outcomes.
Risk preferences and the availability of institutions that facili-
tate risk bearing are not independent (Roumasset, 1976; Eswaran
& Kotwal, 1986; Mendola, 2007). Empirical studies by Gloede,
Menkhoff, and Waibel (2015) and Sakha (2019) show that the
exposure of rural households to uninsured weather anomalies
increases individual risk-aversion.1 We hypothesize that farmers’
access to WICI – a climate risk transfer mechanism – could be a stim-
ulus that may have a reverse effect. As such, improving rural house-
holds’ access to formal climate risk transfer mechanisms that buffer
the households’ livelihood from the effects of weather shocks may
reduce farmers’ risk-aversion. To date, empirical studies have not
explored this possibility as they have focused on the effects that
farmers’ risk preferences have on the uptake of WICI as demon-
strated in Giné, Townsend, and Vickery (2008), Cole et al. (2013),
Hill, Hoddinott, and Kumar (2013), Karlan et al. (2014), and Jin,
Wang, and Wang (2016). However, the implicit assumption that
farmers’ risk preferences are exogenous and cannot be changed
may be excessive (Melesse & Cecchi, 2017). Our study contributes
to the literature by examining the impact of agricultural households’
access to WICI on their risk-aversion, while taking into account the
endogeneity of both risk preferences and WICI uptake. The sources
of endogenous WICI uptake are: (i) the effect of risk preferences
on WICI uptake (simultaneity bias), and (ii) the effect of unobserved
heterogeneity among farmers that can simultaneously affect risk
preferences and WICI uptake (self-selection bias).
Our study is set in Ethiopia, where devastating negative rainfall
shocks are ubiquitous (Suryabhagavan, 2017). The study provides1 The evidence on the impact of climate shocks on individual risk preferences using
cross-sectional data in Gloede et al. (2015) is consistent with the findings of Sakha
(2019) that use panel data.valuable insights into the structural relationship between a pilot
program intervention that facilitates access to WICI and farmers’
risk preferences. We rely on an experimental incentive-
compatible risk elicitation method, which according to Charness,
Gneezy, and Imas (2013) and Meyer (2014) enables researchers
to obtain an isolated measure of farmers’ utility curvature param-
eters – risk preferences. In so doing, we analyze the impact of WICI
on farmers’ risk preferences and explore one of the possible causes
of change in risk-aversion. Our study contributes to the small but
growing literature on the effects of markets on individual risk-
aversion (see Section 2 for a review). Outside the context of mar-
kets, there are also few but growing number of empirical studies
that show changes in risk-aversion due to individual’s exposure
to conflict and violence (Voors et al., 2012; Callen, Isaqzadeh,
Long, & Sprenger, 2014; Moya, 2018; Jakiela & Ozier, 2019), climate
shocks and natural disasters (Eckel, El-gamal, & Wilson, 2009;
Cameron & Shah, 2015; Gloede et al., 2015; Cassar, Healy, &
Kessler, 2017; Hanaoka, Shigeoka, & Watanabe, 2018; Sakha,
2019), and financial shocks (Malmendier & Nagel, 2011; Cohn,
Engelmann, Fehr, & Maréchal, 2015).
We utilize data collected from 240 smallholder farmers with
access to a WICI scheme in Northern Ethiopia. Household survey
data were collected from insured and uninsured agricultural
households. We conducted a simple unframed risk experiment to
elicit individual risk preferences using incentive compatible lotter-
ies that involve a choice between a sure amount and a lottery with
two varying pay-offs but equal probability as presented in Brick,
Visser, and Burns (2012). We use a simultaneous equations model
(SEM) and an endogenous switching probit (ESP) model to esti-
mate the impact of WICI on the risk-aversion of farmers, after
adjusting for observed covariates. Our results from the preferred
model (i.e. ESP) show that there is significant positive self-
selection for non-purchaser farmers. Risk-aversion and the deci-
sion not to buy WICI are perfectly correlated. We observe a nega-
tive selection effect for the purchaser farmers, but it is not
statistically significant. The impact estimates show that WICI sig-
nificantly decreases the risk-aversion of farmers. On average, the
risk-aversion of farmers who have purchased WICI is significantly
lower than what it would have been had they not purchased the
insurance product. Similarly, the risk-aversion of non-purchaser
farmers would have also been reduced if they had taken up WICI.
Moreover, if every farmer in the study area is insured, the propor-
tion of risk-averse farmers would decline by 35 percentage points.
If WICI uptake changes risk-aversion, we should also plausibly
observe that in real-life behavior, which we do: WICI increases
mineral fertilizer use. Therefore, WICI uptake can change farmers’
interpretation of the operating environment for farming and ulti-
mately reduces their risk-aversion – a major driver of agricultural
technology adoption.
Our research on the endogeneity of risk preferences in rela-
tion to insurance markets is conceptually relevant to explain
economic decisions of agricultural households in the presence
of climate risks. The findings of our study have important impli-
cations for policy and program interventions that intend to spur
economic development in agrarian economies in the era of fre-
quent and severe climate shocks. Since formal climate risk
transfer mechanisms significantly reduce farmers’ risk-aversion,
investments on risk management policies and strategies can
have long-term effects on agricultural households by bringing
up desirable economic behavior that may enable them to break
out of poverty traps and enjoy virtuous cycle of increasing
income.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
reviews prior works that provide a link between (insurance) mar-
kets and households’ preferences and behavior. Section 3 describes
the insurance product, and presents the source of data and
K.K. Haile et al. /World Development 130 (2020) 104930 3methods of data analysis. Section 4 presents the descriptive and
econometric results of the study, and the discussion based on the
results. Section 5 concludes.2. Literature
2.1. Agricultural households, crop insurance markets, and risk-taking
behavior
At the heart of agricultural households economic model is the
issue of whether production, consumption, and labor supply deci-
sions are simultaneously determined or if they are separable. In
true subsistence farming, a household consumes what it produces
and must rely exclusively on its own resources (Singh, Squire, &
Strauss, 1986). Hence, production, consumption and labor supply
decisions are non-separable. The majority of agricultural house-
holds in developing countries are semi-commercial farms in which
some inputs are purchased and some outputs are sold. If competi-
tive markets exist for factors of production, outputs, and credit and
insurance, prices are exogenous and (climate and market) risks can
be completely diversified resulting in a separable or non-recursive
decision-making process (Roe & Graham-Tomasi, 1985). As such,
production decisions (input use, adoption of farm technologies,
and output choice) affect consumption via food production and
income levels, and those production decisions are entirely inde-
pendent of consumption.
However, in most developing countries, markets related to land,
inputs, credit, insurance, and some basic commodities are incom-
plete, function poorly or may have high transaction costs for agri-
cultural households (de Janvry, Fafchamps, & Sadoulet, 1991).
Hence, the decision process becomes non-separable (circular)
(Singh et al., 1986; Taylor & Adelman, 2003; Mendola, 2007); a
farming household as a consumer affects its behavior as a pro-
ducer, and vice versa. In the presence of climate risks, as an adap-
tive response, farmers usually modify their production practices to
safer but low-return activities as a means of providing self-
insurance to smooth consumption (Rosenzweig & Binswanger,
1993). In these circumstances, liquidity constraints generated by
market imperfections shape agricultural households’ decisions
and behavioral responses that determine their immediate and
long-term income generating capacity.
Recently, field experiments have been carried out in developing
countries to estimate the causal effect of relaxing insurance market
constraints on the households’ tendencies to invest in agricultural
activities that are risky but highly profitable. Hill and Viceisza
(2012) conduct a framed field experiment in rural Ethiopia to
examine farmers’ decision whether to invest in mineral fertilizers
or not in the presence of an insurance market. They found that
farmers’ uptake of the insurance product has a positive effect on
fertilizer purchases. In a randomized experimental setting in rural
India, Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2012) find that rice farmers that
were offered the index insurance product plant less drought resis-
tant (high-risk) but high-yield rice varieties, which may bear desir-
able welfare effects on these households by improving both food
availability and income. Similarly, Karlan et al. (2014) randomly
assigned farmers in Ghana in three treatment arms to receive cash
grants, premiums to purchase rainfall index insurance, or a combi-
nation of the two. They find that the rainfall insurance triggers
agricultural investments and risky production choices with higher
expected returns compared to the means of the control group
farmers. All the studies mentioned above show the impact of WICI
on farmers’ risk-taking in agricultural investment decisions but not
on their risk preferences per se. Our study examines the presence of
a causal relationship between farmers’ access to insurance markets
and their risk preferences.2.2. Markets and endogenous risk preferences
The standard economic assumption of fixed and exogenously
determined preferences has submerged the economic thought that
the natural, social, economic, financial, and political environment
may shape preferences of individuals. The assumption of exoge-
nous and stable risk preferences implies that one should obtain
the same estimate of a curvature parameter of the utility function
when measuring an individual’s risk preferences repeatedly. How-
ever, this has not been the case in most recent empirical studies
which show systematic variations in the parameter that character-
izes an individual’s risk preferences (see Schildberg-hörisch (2018)
for a recent review). The endogeneity of preferences implies that
policies and institutional arrangements affect the evolution of
tastes and values regarding consumption, investment, and other
socio-economic activities (Bowles, 1998). Changes in economic
institutions, such as markets, signal different stimuli to people
and influence them to perceive a different world, which leads to
changes in values and preferences (Bowles, 1998; Gerber &
Jackson, 1993).
In this regard, Palacios-Huerta and Santos (2004) developed a
general equilibrium framework to examine the endogenous forma-
tion of preferences associated with the extent of credit market
completeness in Bangladesh. The primary empirical prediction of
the model is that risk-aversion attitudes will be endogenously
related to credit market arrangements. They used the worst floods
that the country experienced in 1988 as exogenous variation,
which segmented the existing micro-credit institutions, to com-
pare individual risk attitudes during this situation and the more
normal circumstances of 1992. They provide estimates of risk-
aversion coefficients that are significantly lower for households
where credit markets appear to be well-functioning relative to
the poorly functioning counterfactual. Melesse and Cecchi (2017)
use an artefactual field experiment in Ethiopia to offer insights into
changes in individuals’ risk preferences as a result of their expo-
sure to output markets. Their empirical analyses reveal that farm
households with greater market experience are more risk tolerant.
They indicate that risk-aversion is a trait that can be endogenously
changed through increasing the households’ exposure to markets,
and thus the claim that farm households are inherently risk-
averse may be excessive. To the best of our knowledge, our study
is the first empirical investigation that attempts to establish a cau-
sal relationship between farmers’ access to crop insurance market
and risk-aversion.3. Methodology
3.1. Description of the WICI scheme
This study evaluates the WICI scheme in Ethiopia. The existing
scheme is the continuation of the Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for
Adaptation (HARITA) pilot program which was initiated in 2009
insuring 200 households in one district in Tigray regional state of
Ethiopia. Building on the success of HARITA, the R4 rural resilience
initiative emerged in 2011, bringing together a network of partners
including the World Food program (WFP), Oxfam America (OA),
Relief Society of Tigray (REST), Nyala Insurance Share Company,
Africa Insurance Company, Dedebit Credit and Savings Institution
(DECSI), Mekelle University, and the International Research Insti-
tute for Climate and Society (IRI) (Madajewicz, Tsegay, & Lee,
2017).
The main objective of R4 is to enable farmers manage climate
risks and attain food and income security. In 2017, R4 reached a
total of more than 31, 942 farming households in 11 districts in
Tigray and 1 district in Amhara national regional states of Ethiopia
4 Appendix A in the supplementary materials presents the instruction for the risk
experiment.
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covers major cereals (i.e. teff, wheat, barley, maize, and sorghum)
that are widely produced in the study Tabias, which are the smallest
administrative units within a district. Insurance enrollment usually
takes place between March and June. During the survey period,
farmers paid a premium of 160 ETB for a single insurance coupon
that paid out on average 800 ETB. The WICI scheme also has an
insurance-for-work component which allows farmers to pay their
premium by providing their labor to the public works of the national
safety net program (PSNP) (Madajewicz et al., 2017).
A unique aspect of the WICI scheme under the R4 initiative is
the comprehensive strategy that is implemented to handle the
issue of weather-related basis risk. Basis risk is an inherent prob-
lem to index insurance such that there is a mismatch between
the index-triggered payouts and the actual losses suffered by farm-
ers. The WICI scheme has a separate R4 basis risk fund to ensure
that losses are compensated for farmers in areas where the index
has not adequately captured negative rainfall shocks, and these
payments are made at the same time as the insurance payouts
(WFP/OA, 2018). Therefore, the WICI under the R4 initiative is
more risk-free than the common index-based insurance products
in other developing countries. Currently, the R4 initiative
expanded to reach farmers in Senegal, Malawi, Zambia, Kenya
and Zimbabwe (WFP/OA, 2018).
3.2. Source and type of data
This study is based on data collected from farmers that reside in
tabias with access to WICI in Tigray regional state of Ethiopia. We
collected primary data from insured and uninsured farming house-
holds using a household survey and an incentivized risk experi-
ment. A multistage random sampling method was employed to
generate a total sample of 240 agricultural households. Tigray
regional state has a total of 34 districts. R4 is operating in 11 dis-
tricts where each district comprises of 15 to 20 tabias, and not all
the tabias in the R4 districts have access to the WICI. Therefore,
we take this into account in our multistage random sampling pro-
cedure. First, we randomly selected 2 districts (namely Alamata
and Raya Azebo) from the list of 11 districts with some of their
tabias having access to WICI. Then, from a total of 16 tabias that
have access to WICI in the two districts, five (two from Alamata
and three from Raya Azebo) were randomly picked. Finally, we ran-
domly selected a total of 120 purchaser and 120 non-purchaser
households from the five tabias. A structured questionnaire was
prepared to collect socioeconomic data that focus on the demo-
graphic, agronomic and institutional variables in the 2017 farming
season.
As part of the larger survey, an unframed incentivized risk
experiment was also carried out individually to elicit the risk pref-
erences of the sample farmers. Incentivized experiments are
regarded as appropriate because they minimize self-serving biases,
inattention, and strategic motives that distort self-reported risk
attitudes (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999). This paper utilized the exper-
imental game protocol outlined by Brick et al. (2012),3 which
allows classifying risk-aversion categories based on expected utility
theory (EUT). A simple game protocol, similar to the one we used in
this study, is a reliable measurement tool of risk preferences in a
mostly illiterate sample (Dave, Eckel, Johnson, & Rojas, 2010) and2 The R4 pilot WICI scheme in Ethiopia is implemented in districts that suffer
severe and frequent drought shocks. However, some of the tabias in the R4 districts do
not have access to WICI. These tabias are excluded because of a mismatch between
the historical drought seasons that the households reported and the satellite rainfall
data (upon which the index is computed).
3 We maintain the original design as outlined by Brick et al. (2012), but we used
fewer decision tasks to make the risk elicitation experiment as simple as possible
without compromising its construct validity.adequately captures differences in individual risk preferences
(Charness et al., 2013). The risk preferences elicitation experiment
was administered individually after the completion of the survey.4
The maximum possible earnings from the experiment were 20
ETB5 with subjects receiving 11.30 ETB on average. This amount is
higher than the opportunity cost of their time spent participating
in the experiment and hence ensures a salient incentive for the farm-
ers to make their decisions carefully.6
As depicted in Table 1, after a practice round, the experimenter
asked each farmer to make five choices involving real money. Each
choice (task) is a decision between picking a sure amount of money
in option A, and tossing a coin in option B to earn either 20 ETB if
the head comes up or nothing, if tail did. While farmers made deci-
sions on five tasks, only one was randomly picked to determine
their earnings. Since they could not know in advance which task
will that be and each task has an equal chance of being used in
the end, subjects are expected to think carefully about which
option they prefer in each task. The first task is a rationality check
and merely tests whether the participants understood the game.
We also enforced monotonicity – if they switched they should
switch from option A to option B only once. One subject, however,
shifted between option A and option B multiple times. Conse-
quently, the subject was excluded from the analysis because the
range of the risk preference parameter could not be computed.
Hence, we are left with a sample of 239 heads of smallholder farm-
ing households for our analyses.
We followed the constant relative risk-aversion (CRRA)7 utility
function to compute the range of the risk preference parameter at
each task where the switch could happen. Based on these ranges,
we classified the risk preferences of farm households into four cate-
gories – risk-takers, risk-neutral, risk-averse, and highly risk-averse8.
For instance, for a given farmer who shifted from option A to option
B in the second task the range of the risk preference parameter
(1:41 < r < 0) is computed as compound inequalities given by;
201r
1 r >
0:5 201r
1 r and
151r
1 r <
0:5 201r
1 r
Based on Table 1, our ordinal risk preferences variable entails
the four risk preference categories, ordered, based on the level of
risk-aversion as follows;
Riskpreferences ¼
1 if risk-taker
2 if risk-neutral
3 if risk-averse or highly risk-averse
8><
>:
Moreover, to facilitate the estimation of treatment effects using a
small sample and more flexible model specification, following
Cameron and Shah (2015) and Jakiela and Ozier (2019) we con-
verted our ordinal risk preference dependent variable into a binary
variable. We framed the binary variable to indicate risk-aversion of
farmers as follows;
Riskaverse ¼ 1 if risk-averse or highly risk-averse
0 if risk-neutral or risk-takers

One ETB is 0.044 U.S. Dollar based on the survey period average official exchange
rate, which is obtained from OANDA currency converter http://www.oanda.com/
currency/converter.
6 Public works participation in the districts pays 14 ETB per day during the survey
period.
7 CRRA states that the degree of risk-aversion remains constant when both the
monetary payoff of the lotteries and wealth increase proportionally. Under CRRA
utility function, the range of the risk preference parameter is computed as; u ¼ x1r1r.
8 The highly risk-averse farmers are those who shifted at the 5th task or those who
did not shift at all (i.e those who chose option A throughout).
Table 1
Experimental game tasks and elicited risk preferences.
Task Option A Option B Risk-preference Risk-preference
Sure Amount Outcome 1 Outcome 2 Parameter range Category
1 20 20; 12 0;
1
2
r < 1:4 Rationality-check
2 15 20; 12 0;
1
2
1:41 < r < 0 Risk-takers
3 10 20; 12 0;
1
2
0 < r < 0:42 Risk-neutral
4 6 20; 12 0;
1
2
0:42 < r < 0:7 Risk-averse
5 2 20; 12 0;
1
2
0:7 < r Highly risk-averse
The last two columns are not shown or told to the subjects.
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Using a naïve ordered probit model, the effect of WICI on the
risk preferences of farmers can be estimated by regressing the
latent variable representing the propensity of risk-aversion of
farmer i (Yi ) on the WICI uptake of the farmer (Ti) and a vector
of household characteristics (xi) assuming exogenous WICI uptake
– the correlation between the error term (x1i) and Ti is zero. a and
b1 are unknown parameters to be estimated.
Yi ¼ aTi þ xib01 þx1i; x1  Nð0;r2Þ ð1Þ
where the subscripts indicate variation over farmers (i = 1, 2, . . ., N).
The latent risk-aversion variable (Yi ) and thresholds (g1 and g2) are
not directly observed. Instead, we only observe
Yi ¼
1 if Yi 6 g1
2 if g1 < Y

i 6 g2
3 if Yi > g2
8><
>:
For this study, however, the assumption of exogenous WICI uptake
decision of farmers is unrealistic due to self-selection and simul-
taneity biases. Hence, the ordered probit specification may result
in biased estimates on the causal effect of purchasing WICI on the
level of risk-aversion of farmers. To address the problem of
endogeneity in Eq. 1, we use a maximum likelihood estimator of
an ordinal outcome with a binary endogenous regressor under the
simultaneous equations model (SEM). Maximum likelihood estima-
tors have the properties of being consistent and asymptotically effi-
cient (Greene, 2012). The SEM jointly determines Eqs. (1) and (2) as
a system of two equations that allows risk preferences to be corre-
lated with the binary WICI uptake choice in Eq. 2, and WICI uptake
to be an endogenous regressor in the ordinal risk preferences out-
come variable in Eq. 1. This enables us to estimate the coefficient
on Ti (a) as the unbiased measure for the average treatment effect
(ATE) – the average effect of changing the whole population from
being non-purchasers to purchasers of WICI. The binary endoge-
nous WICI uptake is modeled as;
Ti ¼ xib02 þ cZi þx2i; x2  Nð0;r2Þ ð2Þ
where, the ith farmer’s propensity to purchase WICI (Ti ) is a latent
continuous variable for which only the binary variable Ti is
observed such that;
Ti ¼
0 if Ti  0
1 if Ti > 0

where xi is a vector of variables identical to the one in Eq. 1 and Zi is
an instrumental variable (IV). The SEMmodel is generally identified
even in the absence of the excluded variable (Zi). However, to
improve identification we used a binary variable that indicates
whether farmers live in the same village with the insurance fore-
man as the excluded variable from Eq. 1. Nigus, Nillesen, and
Mohnen (2018) used a similar IV in their analysis on the effect of
WICI on social capital. The rationale behind choosing this IV is thatthe insurance foremen are tasked for promoting and creating
awareness among farmers about WICI. We, therefore, hypothesized
farmers are likely to have better knowledge and attitudes about
WICI if the foreman lives in the village they belong to, and ulti-
mately influence their decision to opt for the insurance uptake.
Moreover, the assignment of the foremen are an administrative
level decision which is independent of the households’ risk behav-
ior. a; c; b1 and b2 are unknown parameters to be estimated.
ðx1i;x2iÞ0 is a vector of error terms that follows a bivariate standard
normal distribution with correlation coefficient q described as;
x1i x2ið Þ0  N 0 0ð Þ0;
1 q
q 1
  
We also used a full information maximum likelihood (FIML) under
the endogenous switching probit (ESP) model to take into account
the interdependencies between WICI uptake and separate equa-
tions for the outcome variables (i.e. risk-aversion and mineral fertil-
izer use) of purchasers and non-purchasers. ESP is a more flexible
specification than SEM since it allows the effects of household char-
acteristics on the outcome variables to vary between the purchaser
and non-purchaser farmers. Consequently, besides the ATE, we can
also estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) and
average treatment effect on the untreated (ATU). The ATT is the
average effect of WICI on those farmers who have purchased the
insurance. The ATU is the average effect of WICI on the risk-
aversion of non-purchasers had they decided to uptake the
insurance.
The ESP model simultaneously considers a binary outcome vari-
able – risk-aversion or fertilizer use – that describes the behavior
of farmers with two regimes (Eqs. 3 and 4) and a switch (selection)
function (Eq. 2) that determines which regime the farmer faces.
Along with Eq. 2, the ESP can be specified as a system of equations
for latent variables as;
Y1i ¼ x1is01 þ e1i ð3Þ
Y0i ¼ x0is00 þ e0i ð4Þ
where the observed farmer’s WICI uptake decision is as defined
under Eqs. 2. Y1i
 and Y0i
 are the latent variables for the binary out-
come variable of the purchasers and non-purchasers respectively.
The observed Yi is defined as:
Yi ¼
Y1i if Y

1i > 0andTi ¼ 1
Y0i if Y

0i > 0andTi ¼ 0

Moreover: x1i and x0i are vectors of explanatory variables; c;b2; s1
and s0, are unknown parameters to be estimated; and x2i; e1i, and
e0i are the error terms which are jointly normally distributed with
a mean-zero vector and correlation matrix:
X ¼
1 q0 q1
1 q10
1
0
B@
1
CA
Table 2
Mean and mean difference tests of the variables included in the analyses.
Non-
purchasers
Purchasers t-test
(N = 119) (N = 120)
Variables Mean Mean Mean Diff.
Variables of interest
Risk preferences
risk-taker 0.479 0.400 0.079
risk-neutral 0.193 0.150 0.043
risk-averse 0.328 0.450 0.122*
Mineral fertilizers use 0.351 0.342 0.009
Same village with insurance
foreman
0.361 0.733 0.372***
Control variables
age 39.66 41.53 1.88
sex 0.824 0.742 0.082
education 0.378 0.408 0.030
active people 2.403 3.042 0.638***
asset holdinga 15.06 15.76 0.70
tropical livestock unitb 5.778 4.264 1.514***
land holding 1.330 1.102 0.228**
housing condition 0.807 0.792 0.015
access to credit 0.714 0.817 0.102*
private transfer 0.445 0.342 0.104
cooperative member 0.723 0.675 0.048
iddir memberc 0.950 0.975 0.025
equb memberc 0.471 0.442 0.029
ties with training office 0.101 0.642 0.541***
own TV or radio 0.269 0.467 0.198***
own phone 0.773 0.733 0.040
Notes: Appendix Table A1 in the supplementary materials presents the full
description of each variable.
a Asset holding is an index (scaled between 0 and 100) constructed based on
binary variables indicating the household’s ownership of; stove, television, radio,
telephone, fridge, and drip-irrigation equipment.
b We measured livestock holding using Tropical Livestock Unit (TLU) based on
Jahnke (1982) conversion factors as Camel 1.0; horse 0.8; cattle and mule 0.7 each;
donkey 0.5; pig 0.2; sheep and goat 0.1 each; and chicken 0.01.
c Self-help groups, which are widely prevailing informal institutions in Ethiopia.
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x2, and e1 and e0 respectively. While q10 can not be estimated, q0
and q1 are identified since the data provide information on the cor-
relations (Miranda & Rabe-Hesketh, 2006). If q0 – q1 – 0, treating
WICI as an exogenous variable delivers inconsistent estimator
because WICI uptake decision is correlated with e0 and e1 (Huang,
Raunikar, & Misra, 1991). As such, q0 and q1 capture the extent to
which risk-aversion affects WICI uptake decision of non-
purchasers and purchasers, respectively.
The ESP analysis also does not require exclusion restrictions to
identify treatment effects since the model can be identified by the
non-linearities in the inverse mills-ratio using two-step estimation
method (Heckman, 1978). As a consequence, ESP model can be
estimated without Zi such that xi; x1i and x0i contain identical ele-
ments. However, Maddala (1983) noted that specifying at least
one exclusion restriction better identify the selection mechanism
and FIML estimation method is more efficient than two-step esti-
mation procedures to estimate ESP. To that end, we used the binary
variable that captures whether the foreman lives in the same vil-
lage with the household as the excluded variable from the vectors
x1i and x0i. Following Aakvik, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2005) and
Lokshin and Sajaia (2011), after estimating the parameters of the
ESP model using FIML method, we can compute endogeneity-bias
corrected estimates of the variant treatment effect measures –
ATT Eq. (5), ATU Eq. (6), and ATE Eq. (7) – as:
ATT ¼ E PrðY1 ¼ 1 jT ¼ 1;X ¼ xÞ  E½PrðY0 ¼ 1 jT ¼ 1;X ¼ xÞ½ 
¼ E U2ðx1s1; Zc;q1Þ U2ðx0s0; Zc;q0Þ
FðZcÞ
 
ð5Þ
ATU ¼ E½PrðY1 ¼ 1 jT ¼ 0;X ¼ xÞ  E½PrðY0 ¼ 1 jT ¼ 0;X ¼ xÞ
¼ E U2ðx1s1;Zc;q1Þ U2ðx0s0;Zc;q0Þ
FðZcÞ
 
ð6Þ
ATE ¼ E½PrðY1 ¼ 1 jT ¼ 1;X ¼ xÞ  E½PrðY0 ¼ 1 jT ¼ 0;X ¼ xÞ
¼ E Fðx1s1Þ  Fðx0s0Þ½  ð7Þ
where U2 is the cumulative function of a bivariate normal distribu-
tion and F is the cumulative function of a bivariate normal
distribution.
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Descriptive statistics
The experimental results show that 39 percent of farmers in the
study area are risk-averse. Our estimate is comparable to the find-
ings of a recent study by Jin, He, Gong, Xu, and He (2017) who used
similar risk preference elicitation experimental games and found
that 44 percent of the households in rural China are risk-averse.
Table 2 depicts the mean values for the continuous variables and
mean proportions for the binary variables under the two groups
– purchasers and non-purchasers of WICI. We used the indepen-
dent t-test to assess whether the mean values or proportions of a
given variable vary across the two groups of households.
The averages show that non-purchasers are less risk-averse
than purchaser farmers. A significantly larger proportion of pur-
chasers live in the same village with the insurance foreman. On
average, the purchaser households have a higher number of eco-
nomically active members than their non-purchaser counterparts.
The average land and livestock holdings of the non-purchasers are
significantly higher than that of the purchasers. With regard to
access to credit and ownership of television or radio, on average,
the purchaser farmers are better off than the non-purchasers. Inaddition, a significantly higher proportion of the purchasers have
personal ties with someone who works at the training and devel-
opment office of the R4 WICI project.4.2. Estimation results
The selection equation (farmers’ WICI purchase decision) and
the outcome equation(s) (farmers’ risk-aversion) of the SEM and
ESP models are estimated simultaneously. To facilitate detailed
discussion, the results from the selection and outcome models
are presented separately in the following sub-sections.4.2.1. Selection model – Demand for WICI
Our analyses are based on a sample of purchasers and non-
purchasers that reside in tabias where the WICI scheme exists.
Table 3 presents the estimation results on the selection (WICI
uptake) equation after adjusting for the effects of observable and
unobservable heterogeneity. We find a robust positive effect of liv-
ing in the same village with the foreman (our instrumental vari-
able) on the probability of farmers’ WICI uptake. The ESP is our
preferred model for the reasons described in Section 4.2.2, and
we discuss the results from column (2) in Table 3. The results show
that farmers who live in the same village with the insurance fore-
man have 17 percentage points higher probability of purchasing
WICI. A falsification test proposed by Di Falco, Veronesi, and
Yesuf (2011) was executed to establish the admissibility of our
instrument. Our IV does not enter as a statistically significant vari-
able when included in a probit regression on the risk-aversion of
Table 3
Selection model: Purchase of WICI.
(1) (2)
SEM ESP
Variables Probit (WICI uptake) Probit (WICI uptake)
Coeff. AME Coeff. AME
same village with foreman 0.8021*** 0.1808*** 0.7439*** 0.1665***
(0.2054) (0.0433) (0.2357) (0.0497)
age 0.0265 0.0060 0.0175 0.0039
(0.0163) (0.0037) (0.0168) (0.0037)
sex 0.2644 0.0596 0.2531 0.0566
(0.2679) (0.0603) (0.2872) (0.0638)
education 0.2248 0.0507 0.1893 0.0424
(0.2156) (0.0493) (0.3055) (0.0684)
active people 0.1294* 0.0292* 0.1545* 0.0346*
(0.0729) (0.0161) (0.0890) (0.0201)
asset holding 0.0041 0.0009 0.0002 0.0001
(0.0111) (0.0025) (0.0108) (0.0024)
tropical livestock unit 0.0829* 0.0187** 0.1120*** 0.0251***
(0.0434) (0.0095) (0.0293) (0.0063)
land holding 0.2703* 0.0609* 0.2357 0.0527
(0.1583) (0.0357) (0.1528) (0.0346)
housing condition 0.0772 0.0174 0.2024 0.0453
(0.3019) (0.0680) (0.2663) (0.0596)
access to credit 0.4014* 0.0905* 0.4649* 0.1040*
(0.2311) (0.0519) (0.2429) (0.0541)
private transfer 0.0080 0.0018 0.0917 0.0205
(0.2726) (0.0614) (0.2507) (0.0560)
cooperative member 0.6758** 0.1524*** 0.5734** 0.1283**
(0.2696) (0.0578) (0.2478) (0.0537)
iddir member 1.0999 0.2480 1.6156** 0.3615**
(0.9376) (0.2078) (0.6988) (0.1507)
equb member 0.2085 0.0470 0.2442 0.0546
(0.2523) (0.0563) (0.3050) (0.0682)
ties with training office 1.9116*** 0.4310*** 2.0568*** 0.4602***
(0.2996) (0.0447) (0.3222) (0.0555)
own TV or radio 0.2298 0.0518 0.0222 0.0050
(0.3193) (0.0720) (0.2828) (0.0633)
own mobile phone 0.1732 0.0390 0.1613 0.0361
(0.2974) (0.0667) (0.3155) (0.0702)
Constant 2.6104*** 2.9502***
(0.9843) (0.9083)
Observations 239 239
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
SEM, ESP and AME stand for simultaneous equations model, endogenous switching probit and average marginal effect respectively.
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materials).
The average marginal effects (AME) for the remaining variables
in the selection equation, i.e. the effects of changes in variables on
the probability of WICI uptake, are also shown in Table 3 next to
each coefficient estimate.9 Households with a larger number of eco-
nomically active family members have a higher probability of WICI
uptake. Household income is an increasing function of economically
active family members Manlagñit (2004) that may avail more finan-
cial resources for agricultural investments such as the purchase of
WICI. Farmers’ demand for WICI increases with their access to credit.
Credit relaxes the households’ liquidity constraints, and hence can
significantly increase the probability that households purchase WICI.
This result is similar to the findings of Giné et al. (2008) in rural India
and Hill et al. (2013) in rural Ethiopia. The positive effect of iddir
membership on the households’ demand for WICI in Ethiopia is also
documented in studies by Dercon, Hill, Clarke, Outes-Leon, and
Taffesse (2014) and Berg, Blake, and Morsink (2017).
Farmers that have ties with a person who works in the training
office of the R4 WICI pilot project are more likely to purchase WICI.9 The coefficient estimates on our control variables are merely correlational and
could only serve as suggestive results for further enquiry. Hence, we are interested
only in the direction of the associations.This may work through the person’s role in familiarizing a farmer
about the existing agricultural risk management technology in the
study area. In particular, farmers’ contact with the training person-
nel of the project can facilitate the flow of information that could
positively shape their knowledge and attitudes towards WICI,
and ultimately can affect their decision to purchase WICI. How-
ever, we cannot rule out the possible effect of WICI uptake on
the ability of farmers to meet and know people who work in the
project. On the contrary, the number of livestock owned and coop-
erative membership are negatively and significantly correlated
with farmers’ WICI uptake. Households with more livestock can
rely on the sale of their livestock to buffer the effects of climate
shocks Sango, Hoffmann, and Christiaensen (2007), and so they
may prefer to opt against the uptake of WICI. The negative correla-
tion between farmers’ membership of a cooperative organization
and WICI uptake may imply that farmers consider cooperatives
as a substitute for purchasing the insurance product.
4.2.2. Risk-aversion model
Our outcome variable takes the form of either an ordinal risk
preferences variable ordered in accordance with farmers’ levels
of risk-aversion or a binary variable coded as 1 to represent risk-
aversion and 0 otherwise (see Section 3.2). The SEM and ESP esti-
mations were used to estimate the binary WICI uptake and the
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is our preferred model for two main reasons. First, the likelihood
ratio test of independence between the selection and outcome
equations shows that SEM is not a relevant specification for our
data. Second, the Wald test rejects the joint independence of the
risk-aversion equations in the two regimes and the selection
model. The test provides evidence that the naïve ordered probit
or probit estimates (reported in Appendix Table A4) are biased
and inconsistent due to the presence of unobserved factors affect-
ing the selection process and farmers’ risk-aversion simultane-
ously. Moreover, the test also reveals that ESP is more
appropriate model specification than describing the behavior of
all farmers with a single risk-aversion equation – as it is the case
under SEM. Therefore, to economize space, we only discuss the
results from the ESP model.
In the risk-aversion (outcome) equations for the two regimes
(purchasers and non-purchasers), there are a few variables that
significantly correlate with farmers’ risk preferences (Table 4). As
a formal and informal means of relaxing liquidity constraints, pur-
chaser households’ access to credit and equb are negatively corre-
lated with their risk-aversion. The positive correlation between
agricultural landholding and risk-aversion is observed under both
regimes. In addition, risk-aversion of the non-purchasers and asset
holdings are also positively correlated. Land and asset holdings are
proxies for wealth and income-generating capacity of rural house-
holds. A positive correlation between income and risk-aversion of
households is also presented in Bosch-Domènech and Silvestre
(2006). Households’ personal ties with the training personnel of
the WICI scheme and ownership of radio or television – proxies
for the households’ access to information – are negatively corre-
lated with risk-aversion of the non-purchasers group. The other
covariates do not enter as significant predictors in the risk-
aversion equations of the purchaser and non-purchaser farmers.
The error terms in the equations determining the uptake of
WICI and farmers’ risk-aversion of the non-purchasers are per-
fectly negatively correlated (q0 = 1) and statistically significant.
The correlation among the error terms in the selection equation
and the risk-aversion model of the purchasers (q1) is also negative
but it is not statistically significant. These findings imply that self-
selection exists only for the non-purchaser farmers. Non-purchaser
farmers are significantly more risk-averse than a potentially ran-
dom sample.10
4.2.3. The effect of WICI on risk-aversion
Table 5 reports the ATT, ATU, and ATE estimates, derived from
the ESP model as described in Eqs. (5)–(7), respectively. Purchaser
farmers are on average 43 percentage points less likely to be risk-
averse compared with the counterfactual scenario of non-
purchaser farmers. This translates to a reduction in the risk-
aversion of the purchasers by around 50 percent compared with
what it would have been had they not purchased WICI. The non-
purchaser farmers would have also attained, on average, 26 per-
centage points reduction in their risk-aversion if they had taken
up WICI. This translates to a 79 percent decline in the probability
of risk-aversion from the initial sub-population of risk-averse
farmers in the non-purchasers group. Moreover, the average risk-
aversion of farmers would have been lowered by 35 percentage
points had all farmers in the study area decided to purchase the
insurance product. Put differently, if the insurance scheme had
covered every farmer in the study area, the probability of risk-
aversion would have been around 90 percent lower compared with10 Without addressing the endogeneity of risk preferences, risk-aversion may
appear to have a positive effect on WICI uptake and may compel us to state that more
risk-averse farmers are likely to purchase WICI (Appendix Table A3 in the supple-
mentary materials).the counterfactual scenario of none of the farmers had purchased
WICI. If we do not take into account the simultaneity and self-
selection biases in analysing the impact of WICI uptake on farmers’
risk-aversion, we will have a perversely signed average treatment
effect estimate (Appendix Table A4 in the supplementary
materials).
The WICI improves households’ economic outcomes since the
insurance payouts during negative rainfall shocks can stabilize
income and ensure smooth consumption (Janzen & Carter, 2018).
As a crucial determinant of economic outcomes, markets dictate
the formation of values, tastes and preferences by affecting what
individuals must do or be to sustain their livelihood (Gerber &
Jackson, 1993; Bowles, 1998; Palacios-Huerta & Santos, 2004;
Melesse & Cecchi, 2017). In the absence of crop insurance markets,
farmers will ‘‘self-insure” (Rosenzweig & Binswanger, 1993), which
may lead to formation of risk-averse attitudes. As such, WICI
uptake may change farmers’ interpretation of the operating envi-
ronment for farming and ultimately reduces their risk-aversion.
This also has implications on the future uptake of WICI by farmers.
Our study and studies by Giné et al. (2008) and Hill et al. (2013)
find that demand for index-based crop insurance product is low
among risk-averse individuals, which is contrary to that for indem-
nity crop insurance products (Clarke, 2016). Therefore, in the con-
text where there is uninterrupted access to index-based crop
insurance market, purchasers are more likely to continue buying
the insurance product in the future due to them having lower
risk-aversion. However, in the event that access to WICI market
is interrupted due to termination of the R4 initiative or other exter-
nal shocks, we cannot rule out the possibility that the reduction in
farmers’ risk-aversion is reversible as farmers may revert to
‘‘self-insurance”.4.2.4. The effect of WICI on observed risk-taking behavior
In this section, we examine to what extent the effect of WICI on
farmers’ risk-aversion is translated into their economic risk-taking
behavior in daily life. We use the decision to apply mineral fertil-
izers as an observed risk-taking behavior of farmers. Since the early
work by Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993), it has been shown
that farmers in developing countries employ a self-insurance
mechanism by avoiding high-risk high-return agricultural tech-
nologies to minimize income variability. Mineral fertilizers per-
fectly match the definition of high-risk high-return agricultural
technologies. According to Fosu-Mensah and Mensah (2016), a
profound yield-enhancing effect of mineral fertilizers is realized
in soils with sufficient moisture. In the context of rainfed agricul-
ture, their finding may mean that the desirable yield- and
income-boosting effects of mineral fertilizers are associated with
the presence of favorable weather conditions during the agricul-
tural season. Otherwise, households may not recover what they
spend to purchase mineral fertilizers in the presence of insufficient
rainfall (Alem, Bezabih, Kassie, & Zikhali, 2010). Therefore, in an
environment characterized by erratic weather conditions, taking
farmers’ decision to adopt mineral fertilizer as our outcome vari-
able enables us to examine whether WICI uptake has a positive
effect on farmers’ risky but profitable agricultural investment deci-
sions. Our binary outcome variable for fertilizer use takes the value
of 1 if the farmer used mineral fertilizers during the production
year in the survey period, and 0 otherwise.
The positive and statistically significant impact of WICI on the
adoption of mineral fertilizer matches our expectation.11 Table 6
shows that the likelihood of mineral fertilizer use by purchasers of
WICI increased by 60 percentage points. Similarly, the adoption rate11 The parameter estimates of the ESP model are reported in TableA5 in the
supplementary materials.
Table 4
Effect estimates for the covariates under the risk-aversion equations.
(1) (2)
SEM ESP
Variables Ordered Probit (Risk preferences) Probit (Risk-aversion)
Coeff. Average Marginal Effect (AME) Purchasers Non-purchasers
Risk-taking Risk-neutral Risk-aversion Coeff. Coeff.
purchase WICI 0.1639 0.0597 0.0017 0.0580
(1.7387) (0.6320) (0.0175) (0.6146)
age 0.0104 0.0038 0.0001 0.0037 0.0018 0.0167
(0.0139) (0.0050) (0.0002) (0.0049) (0.0194) (0.0154)
sex 0.0099 0.0036 0.0001 0.0035 0.1757 0.1108
(0.2494) (0.0908) (0.0026) (0.0882) (0.4175) (0.3429)
education 0.0803 0.0293 0.0008 0.0284 0.1399 0.1159
(0.1860) (0.0676) (0.0022) (0.0657) (0.3391) (0.2663)
active people 0.0876 0.0319 0.0009 0.0310 0.1477 0.0735
(0.0600) (0.0213) (0.0011) (0.0209) (0.0899) (0.0721)
asset holding 0.0049 0.0018 0.0001 0.0017 0.0042 0.0386***
(0.0091) (0.0033) (0.0001) (0.0032) (0.0112) (0.0145)
tropical livestock unit 0.0302 0.0110 0.0003 0.0107 0.0084 0.0178
(0.0400) (0.0143) (0.0005) (0.0140) (0.0640) (0.0302)
land holding 0.1487 0.0541 0.0016 0.0526 0.3484* 0.2678*
(0.1569) (0.0578) (0.0028) (0.0556) (0.2093) (0.1585)
housing condition 0.1073 0.0391 0.0011 0.0380 0.0560 0.1067
(0.2182) (0.0794) (0.0027) (0.0771) (0.3725) (0.2782)
access to credit 0.5262* 0.1916* 0.0055 0.1861* 0.8426** 0.1938
(0.2713) (0.1000) (0.0078) (0.0952) (0.3640) (0.2754)
private transfer 0.0429 0.0156 0.0005 0.0152 0.3215 0.1995
(0.1688) (0.0615) (0.0018) (0.0597) (0.3058) (0.2487)
cooperative member 0.1077 0.0392 0.0011 0.0381 0.2579 0.2287
(0.4147) (0.1516) (0.0050) (0.1468) (0.3442) (0.2802)
iddir member 0.0603 0.0220 0.0006 0.0213 0.6984 0.2619
(0.5895) (0.2144) (0.0061) (0.2084) (1.0722) (0.5744)
equb member 0.2570 0.0936 0.0027 0.0909 0.6361** 0.3840
(0.2566) (0.0944) (0.0046) (0.0909) (0.3220) (0.2742)
ties with training office 0.5394 0.1964 0.0057 0.1908 0.2331 0.6350*
(1.0368) (0.3732) (0.0101) (0.3651) (1.3863) (0.3541)
own TV or radio 0.2505 0.0912 0.0026 0.0886 0.2023 1.0390***
(0.2272) (0.0828) (0.0040) (0.0802) (0.3253) (0.3234)
own mobile phone 0.0061 0.0022 0.0001 0.0021 0.3848 0.0533
(0.2321) (0.0845) (0.0024) (0.0821) (0.3685) (0.3700)
Constant 0.7835 0.0015
(2.6599) (0.7831)
rho (qi) 0.0916 0.4714 1***
(1.0999) (1.3241) (2.43E11)
Observations 239 239
Test of qi = 0 (p value) 0.934 0.045
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
SEM, ESP and AME stand for simultaneous equations model, endogenous switching probit and average marginal effect respectively.
We used Stata commands developed by Roodman (2011) and Lokshin and Sajaia (2011) for the simultaneous equations model (SEM) and endogenous switching probit (ESP)
analyses, respectively.
Tests of joint independence (p values) are based on the likelihood ratio and Wald tests under the SEM and ESP models respectively.
Table 5
Treatment effect estimates: Impact of WICI on risk-aversion.
Treatment effect estimates Observations Estimate
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) 120 0.4267***
(0.0221)
Average Treatment Effect on the Untreated (ATU) 119 0.2620***
(0.0235)
Average Treatment Effect (ATE) 239 0.3506***
(0.0160)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01.
We used the Stata command developed by Lokshin and Sajaia (2011) for estimating
the treatment effects.
Table 6
Treatment effect estimates: Impact of WICI on mineral fertilizers use.
Treatment effect estimates Observations Estimate
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) 120 0.5958***
(0.0249)
Average Treatment Effect on the Untreated (ATU) 119 0.3295***
(0.0226)
Average Treatment Effect (ATE) 239 0.4617***
(0.0159)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01.
We used the Stata command developed by Lokshin and Sajaia (2011) for estimating
the treatment effects.
K.K. Haile et al. /World Development 130 (2020) 104930 9of non-purchasers would have increased by 33 percentage points if
they had taken-up WICI. These findings imply that the magnitude
of the impact of WICI on the application of mineral fertilizer is largerfor purchaser farmers. Insuring all farmers in the study area would
have increased the probability of mineral fertilizer application by
46 percentage points compared to the scenario where none of the
10 K.K. Haile et al. /World Development 130 (2020) 104930households had purchased WICI. In this case, the adoption rate of
mineral fertilizers in the study area would have been increased to
81 percent.12 Our results show that farmers who purchased WICI
are more likely to benefit from favorable agricultural seasons above
and beyond non-purchasers because of their investments in yield-
boosting agricultural technologies. Changes in risk-aversion may
be a plausible mechanism through which WICI uptake causes an
effect on farmers’ risk-taking behavior in their agricultural invest-
ment decisions – proxied by adoption of mineral fertilizers.
We also examine the relative importance of farmers’ WICI
uptake, risk preferences and other observable characteristics in
predicting their decision to adopt mineral fertilizer.13 This endea-
vor allows us to explore whether WICI uptake is more important
in predicting mineral fertilizer adoption than farmers’ risk prefer-
ences.14 In such a scenario, risk-aversion may have little importance
in explaining the impact of WICI on fertilizer adoption. Appendix
Fig. A1 depicts the ranks of observed variables based on their relative
importance in predicting farmers’ decision to use mineral fertilizer.
Our result supports previous findings by Liu (2013), Ward and
Singh (2015), Brick and Visser (2015), Holden and Quiggin (2017),
who show that risk preferences are the most important drivers of
agricultural technology adoption. The importance of WICI uptake
in predicting household decision to use mineral fertilizer is lower
than the relative importance of farmers’ risk preferences. Taking into
account the results in the preceding section, our findings suggest
that WICI uptake influences household decisions to adopt agricul-
tural technologies mainly through its effect on risk preferences.
Hence, risk preferences are influenced by crop insurance market
arrangements where farmers operate. In turn, risk preferences deter-
mine household decisions to invest in high-risk but profitable agri-
cultural technologies.5. Conclusion
In the presence of uninsured climate risks, farmers in develop-
ing countries acquire their livelihood by engaging in low-risk low-
return practices to provide ‘‘self-insurance” (Rosenzweig &
Binswanger, 1993), which may lead to formation of risk-averse
attitudes. This economic behavior permanently keeps them in
low-income low-investment vicious cycle (Carter & Barrett, 2006;
Dercon & Christiaensen, 2011). One focus area of active research
has been analysing how preferences are formed and change in
the presence of external stimuli. There has been a long-standing
argument about the importance of policies and institutions in
shaping households’ preferences (Roumasset, 1976; Eswaran &
Kotwal, 1986; Bowles, 1998; Palacios-Huerta & Santos, 2004;
Mendola, 2007). However, in the context of formal climate risk
transfer mechanisms, previous studies that examined the relation-
ship between the uptake of WICI and real-life risk-taking behavior
of farmers considered risk preferences as given, which restricts an
empirical inquiry into change in risk preferences as a plausible
mechanism. By taking the case of Ethiopia, this study contributes
to the existing literature on the causes of change in risk prefer-
ences by providing valuable insight into the structural relationship
between a program intervention that facilitates access to WICI and
farmers’ risk-aversion.
Empirically isolating the causal effect of farmers’ WICI uptake
on their risk-aversion using observational data is a challenging
task. Simultaneity bias risk-aversion of farmers determine their12 If our analysis had not considered self-selection bias, the effect of WICI on mineral
fertilizer use would have appeared to be negatively signed (Appendix Table A6 in the
supplementary materials).
13 The random forest (RF) method, which we used for the analysis, is explained in
Appendix B.
14 We thank the anonymous reviewer for this insightful suggestion.WICI uptake decision and self-selection bias the presence of
unobserved farmer characteristics that affect both WICI uptake
and risk-aversion – are serious concerns. We used the ESP model
to address these concerns. Our results from the selection equation
show that promotion and training officers of WICI can play a sig-
nificant role in getting farmers to take-up the insurance product.
The treatment effect estimates provide evidence for a significant
reduction in the risk-aversion of farmers in response to the
uptake of WICI.
We find that farmers who purchased WICI are less likely to be
risk-averse compared to non-purchaser farmers. Similarly, non-
purchasers would have attained a significant reduction in their
risk-aversion if they had taken up the insurance product. Overall,
if the insurance scheme had covered every farmer in the study
area, the probability of risk-aversion would have been around 90
percent lower relative to the counterfactual scenario where none
of the farmers had purchased WICI. We also find that WICI has a
positive and statistically significant effect on farmers’ real-life risk
taking behavior – mineral fertilizer use. We argue that WICI uptake
reduces farmers’ risk-aversion by plausibly changing their inter-
pretation of the operating environment for farming. In turn,
changes in farmers’ risk-aversion is arguably a major channel
through which WICI uptake influences their investment decisions
on high-risk high-return agricultural technologies.
Our study contributes to evidence-informed policymaking that
intends to spur economic growth in developing countries in the
era of frequent and severe climate shocks. Risk preferences are
linked to economic development by influencing households’ pro-
duction, consumption and labor supply decisions that, in turn,
determine the accumulation of human, physical and financial
capital. The role of climate risk management policies in general
and WICI in particular in the poverty alleviation and economic
development can also be channeled through their effects on risk
preferences. Thus, investments on policies and strategies aiming
to improve farmers’ access and uptake of formal climate risk
transfer mechanisms can have long-term effect on the develop-
ment prospects of agrarian economies by bringing up desirable
individual economic behavior that may enable households to
break out of poverty traps and enjoy virtuous cycle of increasing
income.
Since our analyses are based on cross sectional data, we can
assess only the variation in risk-aversion of a given farmer in rela-
tion to WICI uptake at a given point in time. There is a need for fur-
ther investigation on the within-farmer effects of WICI uptake on
risk-aversion using panel data. In so doing, one can robustly iden-
tify whether the observed change in farmers’ risk-aversion in rela-
tion to purchase of WICI is attributed to change in the risk
preference of a given farmer across time. Furthermore, the special
basis-risk fund of the WICI scheme under the R4 initiative, which
we have evaluated in this study, makes it distinct from the com-
mon index-based insurance products that do not have such a fea-
ture. Future research on the impact of WICI without the basis-risk
fund on farmers’ risk-aversion would show the generalizability of
our findings. Moreover, comparative assessments on the adoption
and impact of WICI with and without the basis risk fund would
also be insightful concerning the identification of effective and effi-
cient design feature of the insurance product.CRediT authorship contribution statement
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